

## Appendix D

### Banana Shire Council response

A copy of the 2015 Callide Creek Flood Review Report (draft) was provided to Banana Shire Council with a request for their response.

Responsibility for the accuracy, fairness and balance of the following response from Banana Shire Council, rests with the Chief Executive Officer of Banana Shire Council.

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**Your Reference:**  
**Our Reference:** RG:wn (ES8.12)  
**Contact:** Ray Geraghty (CEO)

21 May 2015

Mr Iain S MacKenzie  
Inspector-General  
Emergency Management  
**By email**

Dear Mr MacKenzie

**Re:**

Thank you for the further consultation draft of the Callide Creek Flood Review. In response, Council would like to make the submissions set out below.

At the outset, Council remains concerned that in many instances, it is not clear precisely what information has been relied upon to make particular statements and findings. While Council acknowledges the constraints associated with a review of this kind, it would appear that some statements and findings have been based merely on personal opinions, matters of impression and hearsay information, rather than fact. It is also unclear to Council what efforts were made to substantiate particular opinions, impressions and hearsay information. In the absence of such information, there are some matters in the report that Council cannot respond to meaningfully.

Council is also concerned about that throughout the report, there is use of the terms Council, LDMG and LDCC interchangeably. Council is not the sole body responsible for preparing for and coordinating a response to a disaster event. Statements to this effect in the report are misleading and should be corrected to refer to the LDMG. The responsibility lies with the LDMG as a whole which includes some Council representatives as well as representatives of key State government entities including the QPS, QFRS, QAS, SES as well as others.

Otherwise, Council believes it is important for the final report to contain the most accurate information possible, as well as balanced views on the matters the subject of your investigation. As such, Council requests that this response be included in the appendices to your final report.

### **BACKGROUND**

Banana Shire is a low growth rural council west of the Great Dividing Range characterised by sparsely populated rural land and small townships with low annual rainfall; as is common of most of Queensland west of the divide. Banana Shire and others like it are unfairly compared to high growth coastal or urban settings. Banana Shire has limited financial resources and its corporate priorities reflect its setting and circumstances. Recent natural disasters have increased demands on financial and human resources.

Flood events occur over the years in Banana Shire. However, the 2010 to 2015 period has seen a greater number of intense events than normal.

The 2010 flood event within Banana Shire impacted the Dawson River catchment mainly around Taroom and Theodore.

The 2013 and 2015 flood events affected the Callide River catchment mainly around Biloela and Jambin; the event was mostly a coastal system which just came over the Great Divide and impacted the eastern part of the Shire. The events from an intensity perspective were reported to be greater than 1 in 1000 year events and much greater than any normal event.

The magnitude of the event, as well as the pressure under which officers were operating while the event was unfolding, should be acknowledged when considering the appropriateness of the actions of Council, the LDMG and other staff.

### **COUNCIL'S TIMELINE COMMENTS**

The draft report contains three timelines with varying levels of detail which discuss actions taken by the LDMG, LECC and/or Council during the event (being the timeline beginning on page 4 of "The Event" section of the report, the "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" beginning on page 6 of "The Event" section of the report and the timeline contained on page 20 of the "Disaster Management Response" section of the report). These timelines do not identify the following key activities that took place:

- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 5:16 pm on 20 February 2015 advising, in response to the phones going out in the call centre, that if followers could not get through to the LDCC they should private message Facebook or email [disaster@banana.qld.gov.au](mailto:disaster@banana.qld.gov.au).
- All three timelines do not refer to the plateau of the inflows into the Callide Dam shown by the 96 km gauge from 5:00 pm til 6:00 pm on 20 February 2015.
- The "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" does not refer to the fact that the Sunwater modelling at 5:41pm on 20 February 2015 did not predict a Callide Dam spill that night. Further, at that time, the 96km gauge was showing that inflows had plateaued.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 5:56 pm on 20 February 2015 advising "*Please be aware we are getting reports of trees down. Please don't go out in these conditions*".
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Media Release at 6:10 pm on 20 February 2015 stating "*GENERAL UPDATE FOR BANANA SHIRE Sunwater monitoring levels at the Callide Dam, appealing to residents in low lying areas to remain vigilant and be prepared to self-evacuate if their situation becomes unsafe.*"
- The "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" which details the request at 4:51pm on 20 February 2015 for an emergency alert should identify that the decision to cancel the request occurred at 6:18 pm. At this time, the LDCC identified that the level of alert which was requested at 4:51 pm (being the lowest level) was no longer appropriate and the LDCC had determined that an emergency warning (being the highest level) should be prepared instead.

- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 6:19 pm on 20 February 2015 advising *"At this stage, no shelters in the Shire have been opened. Residents are encouraged to seek shelter with friends and family first. If the need arises for shelters to become available in the Shire, the Local Disaster Coordination Centre will provide advice accordingly."* The post also advised residents to contact the numbers provided.
- The "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" does not refer to the fact that the Sunwater modelling changed at 6:37 pm on 20 February 2015 to show that the Callide Dam could spill that night.
- The timeline contained on page 5 of "The Event" section of the report does not refer to the advice provided to the LDMG at 7:03 pm that the reduced full supply level may be reached that evening, that the inflows were still rising but that rainfall needed monitoring.
- All three timelines do not refer to all of the LDCC's attempts to contact the SDCC to have an Emergency Alert issued. For instance, officers recall attempts being made between 7:15 pm and 7:30 pm on 20 February 2015 and are attempting to obtain phone logs to confirm this. In addition, an email from the LDCC to the SDCC at 8:09 pm on 20 February 2015 provides mapping "as discussed", which suggests that earlier discussions did take place.
- All three timelines should refer to the fact that between 6:49 pm and 8:48 pm numerous telephone conversations were held between the LDCC and the Watchdesk to attempt to issue an Emergency Warning via the EA system. All timelines should also refer to the LDCC having difficulty sending and receiving emails to the Watchdesk at that time and making telephone calls to the Watchdesk at that time.
- The timeline contained on page 5 of "The Event" section of the report should refer to the fact that the LDMG was not notified that the gates could open as early as 9:00 pm until 7:52 pm on 20 February 2015.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 7:52 pm on 20 February 2015 advising *"The LDMG will meet at 9:00 pm and will be in touch with Sunwater. If possible we will provide a further update."*
- The "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" and the timeline contained on page 20 of the "Disaster Management Response" section of the report do not refer to the fact that it was not until 8:18 pm that the LDMG was informed that inflows into the dam were higher than 2013 and that gate releases were imminent.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 8:27 pm on 20 February 2015 stating that Ergon advised residents to be patient.
- The description of the Facebook post at 8:36 pm on 20 February 2015 contained in page 5 of "The Event" section of the report is misleading as it was not addressed to the Shire at large. It was directed to Biloela residents and advised that emergency services requested that residents stay indoors after the wind and rain has passed as there were powerlines and trees down and emergency services would need to assess the situation. It is not referred to at all in the timeline contained on page 20 of the "Disaster Management Response" section of the report.
- The timeline contained on page 5 of "The Event" section of the report and the "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" do not refer to the call made by the LDCC to the LECC (Acting Jambin Chair) at 8:37 pm on 20 February 2015 informing them to notify residents to evacuate to the school as water was expected to be released soon.

- The timeline contained on page 5 of "The Event" section of the report and the "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" do not refer to the further call made by the LDCC to the LECC (Acting Jambin Chair) at 8:41 pm on 20 February 2015 notifying that the gates had opened and reports were the water may be higher than 2013.
- All three timelines do not refer to the fact that from 8:41 pm onwards on 20 February 2015, staff in the LDCC began ringing contacts and local residents in the affected areas to advise them of the situation and to contact others that they knew to be at risk to provide warnings. A log kept by a member of the LDCC, [REDACTED], shows [REDACTED] telephoned seven individuals to provide warning and requested that they too make contact with any people they knew who would be affected.
- All three timelines make no reference to the LDMG Chair telephoning media outlets from 8:41 pm on 20 February 2015 to inform residents that an emergency evacuation of Jambin and Goovigen had been ordered and that there were problems with the EA system.
- The descriptions of the Banana Shire Council Facebook post at 8:45 pm on 20 February 2015 contained in all three timelines are misleading as they do not reference the fact that the message informed residents that the Council was experiencing difficulties with the SMS alert system at that time.
- All three timelines make no reference to the Facebook post made by the LDCC at 9:19 pm on 20 February 2015 advising "*URGENT – Tognolini-Baldwin Road residents are urged to self-evacuate to relatives or friends. If unable to do so, please contact the disaster call centre on 49923511 or 49924927 to arrange emergency shelter*". This was the first time that the LDCC has ever known of flooding in this area and it was not until shortly before this time that the LDCC was aware that this area would be affected by flood waters.
- The descriptions of the Banana Shire Council Facebook post at 9:58 pm on 20 February 2015 contained on page 5 of "The Event" section of the report and page 11 of the "Summary of the Callide Creek Flood Event" are misleading. The post did not simply state that the Callide Dam gates were open and that water levels were higher than 2013. The message read "*The Coordination Centre along with the rest of the Shire is experiencing difficulties with the Internet and phone connections. We can confirm that the gates to Callide Dam have automatically opened and SunWater have predicted water levels to be higher than 2013. If you are in a low lying area, we urge you to self-evacuate to higher ground.*" The complete message should be included in all three timelines as it gives the context which explains the delay in posting the message (being the communication difficulties) and also shows that the LDCC was urging people in all low lying areas to self-evacuate.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 10:02 pm on 20 February 2015 stating "*Please note the Biloela Civic Centre is open for those evacuating. Please take your own bedding and supplies.*"
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 12:04 am on 21 February 2015 stating "*The Mt Murchinson State School is open if anyone needs to evacuate.*"
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 12:29 am on 21 February 2015 stating "*Council staff and emergency services are attending to requests. Please stay off the roads and follow for updates.*"

- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 12:53 am on 21 February 2015 restating emergency contact numbers that could be used by residents.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 3:03 am on 21 February 2015 advising residents of Road Closures.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 3:52 am on 21 February 2015 stating *"Council staff and emergency services are continuing to attend to callouts and requests. All highways into Biloela are now closed and we encourage people to stay at home. There is water still rising in areas and hazards are present. Remember – if it's flooded – forget it"*
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 4:18 am on 21 February 2015 stating that Ergon had advised they would be there that morning.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 5:22 am on 21 February 2015 stating *"Callide Dam Update: Sunwater have advised that the gates to the Callide Dam are now closed, however there is still large amounts of moving water. We are urging people to stay off the roads and if it is flooded "forget it"."* The LDCC was later informed that the gates were in fact "closing" not "closed".
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a Facebook post at 6:57 am on 21 February 2015 stating *"Helicopters are currently evacuating people from Jambin to Biloela and the situation in Goovigen is being monitored. Hills Avenue residents and people at the Caravan Park on Valentine Plans Road are in the process of being evacuated. We would appreciate it if people could stay off the roads."*
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing a media release providing a general public advice at 7:06 am on 21 February 2015.
- All three timelines do not refer to the LDCC issuing further Facebook posts at 7:23 am, 8:01 am and 9:33 am on 21 February 2015.

The absence of these actions in the timelines gives the appearance that they did not occur or that perhaps there was insufficient activity by the LDCC, which is misleading. Council believes that in order for the final report to paint the complete picture of event, all timelines should identify the above activities.

These comments will be referenced throughout this response as Council's Timeline Comments.

#### **COUNCIL'S AVAILABLE INFORMATION COMMENTS**

The following comments relate to the information available to the LDCC on 20 February 2015 and 21 February 2015.

In numerous places throughout the draft report there are statements that the Council had sufficient information to better prepare the community and that those who were likely at risk could have been identified and told more about what was known.

Council reiterates that it not the sole body responsible for preparing for and coordinating a response to a disaster event. Statements to this effect in the report are misleading and should be corrected to refer to the LDMG. The responsibility lies with the LDMG as a whole which includes some Council representatives as well as representatives of key State government entities including the QPS, QFRS, QAS, SES as well as others.

Once the LDMG moves to "stand up" status, the actioning of a response to the disaster is carried out by the LDCC, which is the operational arm of the LDMG. The LDCC coordinates the response. Once again the LDCC includes some Council representatives as well as representatives of key State government entities including the QPS, QFRS, QAS, SES as well as others. It is not the sole responsibility of the Council to respond to a disaster as this is a responsibility collectively shared by those entities participating in the LDCC. Statements to this effect in the draft report are misleading and should be corrected to refer to the LDCC and not Council where operational matters are being referred to.

In the lead up to the event, information provided by BoM was very general in nature and referred to a flood watch for the entire Dawson catchment and the possibility of flash flooding. The information identified that widespread heavy rainfall of 200 - 300 millimetres could be expected. However, this general information was not sufficient to enable the LDMG to identify whether evacuations would be required, if so which areas would require evacuation, what time the evacuations should be made and by what route they should be made. The information was also of no utility in identifying trigger points for any part of the Banana Shire.

In relation to stream inflows and the river gauge information available to the LDCC during the event, the only real time river gauge information that the LDCC had access to was the gauges which are owned and operated by the Council. All of those gauges are located in the Dawson River catchment and none of them are located in the Callide Creek or the Kroombit Creek.

Council acknowledges that BoM makes publicly available information from gauges which are owned by entities other than Council on its website. However, it is Council's view that the draft report fails to note the significance of this information not being loaded up in real time. The availability of information is dependent upon when the BoM website is refreshed and this can be impacted by communications issues affecting the various gauges. Council has not seen any information which details to what extent problems with the gauges and communications issues resulted in delays to updates on the BoM website on the night. Page 10 of the draft report details that there were problems. However the draft report does not detail how long it was taking before information from the gauges was being uploaded onto the BoM website. It is Council's view that it is important that such information be obtained before an assessment can be made of whether the LDCC had available sufficient information to provide earlier warnings.

It is worthy to note that during 20 February 2015, the only warnings that BoM made that were specific to catchments in Banana Shire were an 11:34 am warning of a flood watch for Dawson catchment and that flash flooding was possible and then a 10:03 pm minor flood warning for the Dawson River, Don River and Callide Creek (their first flood warning for the event).

In addition to the delay issue, pages 9 and 10 of the "Disaster Management" section of the report acknowledge the shortcomings in the quality of information available to the BoM. In particular, it states:-

- *The data issues with the rain gauges above Callide Dam became apparent several hours before midnight;*
- *The BoM provided us with a map of the Flood Warning Network for the Dawson Catchment. This shows that there are no forecast sites in the Callide Valley. ... There are no qualitative forecast sites in the network.*
- *The current documented and endorsed service levels do not require a detailed hydrological model for Callide Creek.*



- *Few information sources of any type are available for the Callide Valley, but improvements are being considered.*
- *With current technology and data sources available for the Callide Valley, predicting the timing and exact location of flash flooding is unlikely. The BoM told us that while they can estimate the amount of rain, predicting the intensity and period over which it will fall is difficult.*

The LDCC was relying upon the BoM information to understand the nature and extent of the event, the fact that the information was not available in real time, the information for the Callide Valley had significant shortcomings and the LDCC had communication difficulties on the night all contributed to the difficulties of the LDCC using the BoM information to provide more timely warnings.

For many areas where localised flooding occurred, there simply was no information available via the BoM website. The best information that the LDCC had during the event was anecdotal accounts which were coming in via the call centre.

The 96km gauge is owned and operated by SunWater. The LDCC did not have real time access to this gauge during the event. The LDCC maintained regular contact with SunWater regarding the readings of this gauge throughout the event. However, there was some lag in the communication of these readings at times.

These lags in information together with the communication difficulties on the night slowed the flow of information coming to the LDCC and slowed the ability of the LDCC to disseminate the information in a more timely manner.

It is also Council's view that the criticisms made about the utilisation of the five LECCs in the Banana Shire area on pages 3 and 4 of the "Disaster Management" section of the report are not warranted. The Council agrees that LECCs are a valuable means of gathering and sharing vital information – this is their key role (as per the Terms of Reference included in the Bundle of Further Documents attached to this response as **Attachment 2**). During the event of 20 and 21 February 2015, the only LECC which was seriously affected by flooding was the Jambin/Goovigen LECC. Communications were made directly between the LDCC and the acting chair of this LECC during the event (refer to Council's comments on the timelines above). Communication to a greater extent with the other four LECCs during the night would not have provided greater intelligence as they were not affected by the event to the same extent as the areas subject to the Callide and Kroombit Creeks. Further, to suggest that LECCs can go out during a cyclone and provide information on "*the heights of watercourses in the area or any key risks for that location*" is not reasonable as this would put members of LECCs at risk. As mentioned in the draft report, often times these people are volunteer local residents acting as a liaison and they do not possess the necessary expertise to be undertaking such tasks.

These comments will be referenced throughout this **response as** Council's Available Information Comments.

### **COUNCIL'S EMERGENCY ALERT COMMENTS**

The following comments relate to the difficulties with the emergency alert system on 20 February 2015.

Council regrets the difficulties that were experienced with the use of the EA system on 20 February 2015 and acknowledges that had they not occurred, more information could have been provided in a more timely fashion.

It is important to note that the LDCC can only *request* than an emergency alert be sent; it cannot actually send one. As such, Council is concerned that the repeated emphasis of the first emergency warning being sent to the Watchdesk at 8:56 pm, without acknowledging the attempts to send the first message from as early as 4:52 pm and the subsequent ongoing discussions between the LDCC and the Watchdesk from 6:49 pm to address the problems being experienced in sending an EA leaves the impression that the LDCC did nothing until 8:56 pm. In that respect, an email attempting to send the mapping at 8:09pm has been provided as part of the Bundle of Further Documents in **Attachment 2** further evidence.

The timeline contained on page 20 of the "Disaster Management Response" section of the report refers to eight telephone calls between the Watchdesk and the LDCC (or the QFRS on behalf of the LDCC) and one email between 6:49 pm and the successful call at 8:56 pm. It was over this two hour period that the difficulties were trying to be overcome.

Council officers had commenced preparation of a template text for warnings as well as template maps as early as 8:00 am on 20 February 2015, which were consistent with the template provided by the State. At this time, the Council was assured that the maps were in the correct format and with the correct file extension as indicated on the application form the LDCC is required to fill out to request an emergency alert.

The message that was attempted to be sent from 4:52 pm until 6:49 pm was a template message. However, due to the problem with the maps it was unable to be dispatched via the EA system.

Between the time when the LDCC cancelled the first EA message attempt and the successful request being made at 8:56 pm, the information regarding the nature and extent of flooding was rapidly changing.

At the time the message was cancelled, the LDCC was of the understanding that the Callide Dam may open sometime during the next 24 hours.

At 7:03 pm, the LDCC was advised that the full supply level trigger may be reached that evening and that the inflows were still rising, but rainfall needed monitoring.

At 7:52 pm, the LDCC was advised that automatic opening of the gates at Callide Dam would occur within hours.

At 8:18 pm, the LDCC was advised that inflows to the Callide Dam were greater than 2013 and automatic gate operation at Callide Dam was imminent.

The notification that the flooding was going to be greater than 2013 meant that the template messages and template maps needed to be changed in order to send out the emergency alert. The information available to the LDCC prior to 8:18 pm did not cause the LDCC to anticipate that the eventual flood was going to be greater than 2013.

Limitations with the EA system made it difficult to quickly draft an appropriate warning. For voice messages, the message is limited to 450 characters (including spaces). For SMS messages, the message is limited to 160 characters (including spaces). It is difficult to quickly draft an appropriate message within these confined parameters together with preparing the relevant map in a high pressure environment like that being experienced at the LDCC at the relevant time.

This explains why at 8:48 pm and again at 8:50 pm, when the LDCC was communicating with the Watchdesk, the advice was that the LDCC had not finalised the message yet. However, an email from the SDCC to the LDCC at 8:29 pm clearly shows that the SDCC had already received the emergency alert message before that time – that email has been included in the Bundle of Further Documents in **Attachment 2**.

The criticisms of the content of the Emergency Warning on pages 24 to 26 of the “Disaster Management Response” section of the report also does not acknowledge the constraints with the number of characters that can be contained in EA messages and fails to identify that this was the reason why more communities could not be identified in the messages that were sent out.

These comments will be referenced throughout this response as Council's Emergency Alert Comments.

## **COUNCIL'S SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT**

### **OVERVIEW**

#### **Foreword**

##### **Pg.2 / Paragraph 5 –**

- Council believes that describing solutions to any systemic difficulties as being “easily addressed” is taking an overly simplistic view of inherently complex matters. Such solutions not only require coordinated efforts and the support of a number of entities, but also significant resources.
- For instance, longer term improvements around flood modelling is particularly resource intensive and has been estimated by Council to cost between \$350,000 and \$400,000.
- Council has already taken the first step in that process and has commissioned the first phase of the study which will cost around \$60,000.
- The reality is that such processes are anything but easy.

##### **Pg.3 / Paragraph 1 –**

- While Council appreciates the circumstances and constraints in which the review has been carried out, it has concerns about statements identifying the report as being based on “facts”, when in reality much of the report is based on recollections and opinions that were formed in testing circumstances. Council says this not as a criticism of the investigation process, but more out of concern that other circumstances are likely to have existed that were not known to those expressing particular opinions.

#### **Executive Summary**

##### **Pg.6 / Paragraph 4**

- Given that the main risk was from the operation of the dam gates, Council believes it was entirely appropriate for focus to be on the gates, notwithstanding that other activities were also monitored (e.g. high winds – a circus was advised to take precautionary measures by securing rides).

##### **Pg.6 / Paragraph 5**

- The reference to ‘cyclone ratings’ (which is presumably a reference to wind ratings) is unnecessary and of no assistance.

- Unlike northern councils in Queensland where purpose-built shelters are built to particular wind ratings, the Civic Centre was built in the late 1970s and is not wind rated, notwithstanding that it was built in accordance with the applicable standards at the time. As such, any suggestion that advising the community to shelter in place put them at greater risk is unjustified.
- Council believes that the statement 'significant flooding in many parts of the shire' is overstating the event. The event only affected catchments in the Biloela and north-eastern area of the Shire.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 1 -

- As to Council having sufficient information to better prepare the community, refer to Council's Available Information Comments above.

Pg.7 / Paragraphs 2 & 3 –

- Refer to Council's Available Information Comments.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 4 –

- Council believes this paragraph is misleading, as it suggests that no other actions were taken by the LDMG during the event. The paragraph makes no reference to media releases throughout the event, and calls made to the SDCC and earlier attempt to issue emergency alerts. Refer to Council's Timeline Comments, Available Information Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 5 –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments above.

Pg.8 / Paragraph 1 –

- Refer to Council's Emergency Alert Comments above.

Pg.8 / Paragraph 3 –

- Following the 2013 event, Council was assured by Telstra that a failure of the system would not be repeated. However, during this event, Council was faced with multiple issues, including:
  - land lines failing due to the fibre optic cables being washed away; and
  - mobile coverage failing due to tower failures, including the generators and other back-up power sources.

## Findings

Pg.10 / Finding 3 –

- Council has already taken the first step in that **process** and has commissioned the first phase of the study which will cost around \$60,000. The total project will cost between \$350,000 and \$400,000.

Pg.10 / Finding 4 –

- Council is concerned about the subjective nature of the survey undertaken. In particular, Council is aware of one particular person who was contacted for the purposes of the survey, who found the questions and the manner in which they were asked to be leading and provocative in nature.

Pg.10 / Finding 8 –

- Council is not clear on what is meant by “operational information **sources**” or the gaps that exist in availability thereof.

Pg.11 / Finding 12 –

- Refer to Council's Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.10 / Finding 15 –

- While a continuity plan would not have necessarily overcome the problem, the LDMG has since directed that this occur.
- Otherwise, Council issue with communications was that following the 2013 event, Council was assured by Telstra that a failure of the system would not be repeated. However, during this event, Council was faced with multiple issues, including:
  - Land lines failing due to the fibre optic cables being washed away; and
  - Mobile coverage failing due to tower failures, including the generators and back-up generators to the towers failing.

**Recommendations**

Pg.13 / Recommendation 2 –

- Council has already taken the first step in that process and has commissioned the first phase of the study which will cost around \$60,000. The total project will cost between \$350,000 and \$400,000.

Pg.14 / Recommendation 6 –

- The independent hydrological assessment was provided to Council on the afternoon of 19 May 2015. Given the technical nature of the document, Council has not had sufficient time to properly consider the matters raised therein in detail. However, Council agrees that the concept has potential, though resourcing will be the critical issue.

Pg.14 / Recommendation 7 –

- Council acknowledges the desire for this to occur and notes that it can be challenging, particularly in rural/remote areas.
- The issue is often compounded by ABC coverage in the Banana Shire where various parts receive coverage from three different areas (Rockhampton, Longreach and Toowoomba), which requires Council to liaise with three different locations.

Pg.14 / Recommendation 8 –

- As above.

Pg.14 / Recommendation 10 –

- While Council agrees that a review is appropriate, it believes that such a review should be carried out independently to ensure unbiased, independent results.
- Council would have concerns about a review being undertaken by key LDMG member agencies. Instead, Council suggests that such reviews be undertaken by the Inspector-General's office if possible.

Pg.15 / Recommendation 11 –

- This has been directed by LDMG at a recent meeting held on 18 May 2015.

**INTRODUCTION**

Pg.3 / Last sentence –

- The independent hydrological assessment was provided to Council on the afternoon of 19 May 2015. Given the highly technical nature of the document, Council has not had sufficient time to properly consider the matters raised therein in detail.

## THE EVENT

Pg.5 – 8.48 pm

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 3 –

- Refer to Council's Available Information Comments.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 8 –

- Refer to Council's Available Information Comments.

Pg.9 –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments.

Pg.11 –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments.

## MANAGING DAMS

Pg.3 / Full Supply Level, Paragraph 4

- The reduced maximum operating level was adjusted in January 2015, and Council did not get the revised EAP until 16 February 2015, i.e. Issue 3 (revision of lake operating levels covering sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 8, 9, 10). Further, a revision of sections 3 and 5A of Issue 3 was only received by Council on 20 February 2015 (the day of the event).

Pg.5 / Last paragraph –

- It should be noted that the 2013 Review of the Callide Dam Gate Operations was only received by Council this week, on Monday, 18 May 2015.

## DISASTER MANAGEMENT & PREPAREDNESS

Pg.4 / Paragraph 3 –

- There are numerous creek systems within the Banana Shire that pose a flood risk. Undertaking such an exercise will require considerable resources as well as making important decisions about how much detail should be included in the LDMP in order to ensure that it is effective.
- Council believes the disaster management guidelines could be improved to provide further guidance on this issue.

Pg.5 / Paragraph 3 / Last Sentence –

- Council believes the statement should read, 'the study has not been undertaken to date, and is reliant on the availability of external funding'.

Pg.5 / Paragraph 4 / Fourth Sentence –

- The statement that Council 'had not actually put out a tender for the project' is incorrect.
- Council advertised the tender in December 2013.
- The tender was awarded in June 2014.
- Ultimately, the project was delayed due to the State government advising that Council had not been successful with its funding renewal application for the continuation of the project.

Pg.5 / Paragraph 5 –

- Council believes it is misleading to describe projects as being 'funded from sources external to the Council'.

- Such projects are only *partially* funded in that manner, and Council is still required to contribute considerable funds of its own, which it simply did not have.

Pg.6 / Paragraph 2 –

- Refer to **Attachment 1** for Council's response to town planning matters.

Pg.6 / Town planning –

- Council disagrees that there is 'no evidence' of risk treatment strategies existing for town planning or building requirements.
- In the paragraphs that follow the statement above, planning scheme provisions are identified which seek to ensure houses are 'not subjected to unreasonable hazards...because of their location'.
- Otherwise, refer to Attachment 1 for Council's response to town planning matters.

Pg.7 / Paragraph 5 –

- Council's view that the State should pursue such legal advice on a State-wide basis is based on a desire to ensure consistency on such matters. Individual councils seeking separate advice could lead to an inconsistent approach across the State. The statement should reflect this.
- Additionally, in accordance with protocols, the LDMG has raised the issue with DDMG about seeking the legal advice required.

Pg.8 / Paragraph 3 / CB Radios –

- It should be noted that CB Radio itself has significant limitations both in range and audience.
- In any event, the use of CB radio would require resources to closely monitor its use and the information being disseminated.

Pg.8 / Telstra offer –

- To the best of Council's knowledge, the Telstra system had not been proven in the field. As such, saying the potential options 'would' have reduced communication issues is being overly optimistic in Council opinion.
- Describing the option as being 'free' is also somewhat misleading. It should be made clear that, while the offer was free for a period of twelve months, it then becomes a pay-for-service arrangement that is limited to two phones.

Pg.9 / Paragraph 1 –

- Council does not believe there is any confusion. The facility was identified in late 2014 and is being assessed for its suitability.
- Any alternative site will require considerable expenditure to meet the needs and requirements of a fully functional LDCC and LDMG.

Pg.11 / Paragraph 3 –

- While Council acknowledges that the LDMG may not have followed through with action items as expeditiously as it could have, Council disagrees that the LDMG regularly did not follow through on action items. As no examples have been identified, Council cannot otherwise respond to this issue meaningfully.
- As for opinions that Council was too reliant on the knowledge and skills of outside agency personnel, it should be noted that the purpose of the LDMG is to utilise the skills and experience of its core members.
- It should also be remembered that the LDMG is not just a Council function. All core members have roles and responsibilities, and it is unfair to attribute comments solely to 'Council'.

## DISASTER MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

### Pg.4 – LDCC –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments.
- The statement that 'many parts of the shire were flooded' is incorrect. As previously stated, there was only flooding in the Biloela area and north eastern area of the Shire.

### Pg.5 / Paragraph 1 –

- It is unclear what is meant by 'deficiencies in the control and coordination of the centre's functions'. Council requires further and better details in order to respond meaningfully.
- As for record keeping, all agencies have had training in Guardian and it is their responsibility to update their database accordingly. That said, the statement makes no recognition of the fact that during the height of an event, it is simply not possible to document each and every detail and action. In that respect, Council notes that some of the personal notes made by its officers have not been formally entered into the system. However, some of these notes (e.g. those of the chief executive officer) have been provided to your office as part of this review.

### Pg.15 / Emergency Alert / Paragraph 1 –

- It should be noted that the Chair of the LDMG was constantly in touch with the media and other outlets. Refer to Council's Timeline Comments.
- In addition, when communication became problematic, staff rang a number of residents in affected areas, although Council notes that the report is critical of such a 'phone-tree' approach in other parts of the report – unfairly in Council's opinion.

### Pg.15 / Emergency Alert / Paragraph 3 –

- Council disagrees with this paragraph.
- The LDMG had to rely on information supplied by SunWater as the dam operator with regard to inflow and release of water from Callide Dam.
- Council believes that focus on the dam gates is justified given that it was the major component of the flood event. However, Council disagrees that any focus was unduly narrowed as a result, as there were also discussions and actions regarding other hazards, such as high winds. For example, a circus was directed to secure its rides as a precautionary measure. Council had also stockpiled sand at key locations in preparation of the event.

### Pg.16 / Paragraph 1 –

- Council is unclear what is meant by these statements and cannot meaningfully respond.
- Council has previously stated that the LDCC staff member is a qualified engineer, who is competent with GIS mapping and uses it in her daily role. She had also performed this task during the 2013 flood event.
- The staff member made three attempts to forward the map files to the SDCC. On the third occasion, the SDCC GIS staff advised that the mapping was acceptable.
- The real issue relates to file types, specification and compatibility.

### Pg.17 / Last Paragraph –

- The focus on a formal resolution is unnecessary. While there was no formal resolution by the LDMG, staff were nonetheless proactive in preparing maps and alerts on the morning of the 20 February 2015.
- Otherwise, refer to Council's Emergency Alert Comments.

### Pg.18 –

- Refer to Council's Emergency Alert Comments.



Pg.18 – Issued Emergency Alert –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments, Available Information Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pgs.20, 21, 22 & 23 –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.23 / Bottom of Page –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.
- Cancellation of the advice message was the only option in the circumstances, as a new message was pending.

Pg.24 / Ongoing Issue re: Alert –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.26 / Top of Page –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.26 - Effectiveness of Emergency Alert –

- Council is concerned about the accuracy of information given. To Council's knowledge, there is no street close to Callide Dam. In the absence of more precise information, Council cannot respond to this paragraph meaningfully.

Pg.28 - Facebook & Other Warnings / Paragraph 2 -

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.28 - Facebook & Other Warnings / Paragraph 3 –

- The criticisms of the 'phone-tree' approach are unfair in Council's view. Staff made the best of the situation at the time.
- In any event, such actions should be recognised in the various timelines as proactive steps taken at the LDCC to warn residents.

Pg.29 / Paragraph 1 –

- Refer to Council's Timeline Comments and Emergency Alert Comments.

Pg.31 / Paragraph 1 -

- in Council's view, the delays experienced is likely to be a result of the communication issues that were being experienced.

Pg.31 / Last Paragraph Last Sentence –

- Council does not believe this to be practical. The important thing was to advise of the operation of the dam gates as soon as possible. In the circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect the first message upon regaining connectivity to be about communication difficulties.

Pg.34 / SunWater Downstream Residents, Paragraph 3 –

- The view that one hour warning is sufficient is of some concern as emergency alerts can take well over that amount of time to be approved and sent.

Pg.35 –

- Council is concerned about any suggestion that SunWater is only responsible for notifying residents 10km downstream from dam wall.

Pg.38 / First Sentence –

- The LDMG was advised by SunWater that it would review the messages.

Pg.45 / Paragraph 5 –

- Refer to Available Information Comments.

Pg.46 / Paragraph 1 –

- The issue of opening shelters was a conscious **decision** of the LDMG not to open and was based on the information available at the time.
- The shelters are not wind/cyclone rated so they may offer no greater protection than a house in any event. For example, unlike northern councils in Queensland where purpose-built shelters are built to particular wind ratings, the Civic Centre was built in the late 1970s and was built in accordance with the building regulations, standards and codes at the time.

Pg.46 / Last Paragraph –

- It is important to note that the overtopping of Kroombit Dam itself does not trigger evacuation requirements.

Pg.47 / Paragraph 3 –

- It should be noted that there was the cyclone itself, followed by flooding post-cyclone – both of which occurred at night, which made it difficult to safely mobilise rescue teams.
- As such, Council does not agree with the last sentence in particular, as it was not a resourcing issue but a situational condition issue.

Pg.48 / Paragraph 1 –

- Refer to Council's Available Information Comments.

Pg.48 / Paragraph 2 –

- Refers to 8 hours. This varies depending on the location, the scenario and the event.
- Council believes that identifying a blanket 8 hours is too simplistic.

Pg.53 / Paragraphs 2 & 3 –

- Suggestions that Telstra attended an LDMG meeting to provide a presentation on DisPlan are somewhat misleading. While Telstra did provide a presentation, DisPlan was only one component of that presentation and inadequate emphasis was put forward about the product to allow the LDMG to make an informed decision one way or another. As such, the statement that Council advised Telstra that it did not wish to take up either offer is not entirely correct. It is otherwise noted that the system is not without its limitations and Council is unsure if it has been proven in the field.
- It should be noted that the Whispir system will work on a subscription-based program and does not replace the emergency alert system.

Council trusts that the above concerns will be appropriately considered for inclusion in your final report.

Yours sincerely



Ray Geraghty  
**CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER**

## ATTACHMENT 1

### *Response to town planning matters*

#### **Background**

Subsequent to the 2010 flood event, the State Government recognised the inadequacy of the majority of flood mapping in Queensland and created the QRA Flood mapping, which is available free on the internet.

The 2005 Banana Planning Scheme included the majority of the shire in the rural zone (characterised by rural production), and this includes the majority of the Shire's flood prone land. This planning scheme approach is normal for the majority of Queensland and was approved by the State Government. The rural zone is extensive and there is a low level of building development which often inhibits the extent and accuracy of flood studies. Much of the rural residential development occurring in flood prone areas of the rural zone is historic (1960's to 1980's) and developed prior to land use planning for natural hazards.

#### **Specific comments**

IGEM Cyclone Marcia report page 6/7 town planning section – paragraphs	Council comment/response
We found no evidence of risk treatment strategies for town planning or building requirements. Discussions with community members also indicate this disconnect.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Council disagrees that there is no risk treatment strategy identified for land-use planning or building requirements any suggestion that Council does not take its responsibility seriously.</li><li>2. Refer to the background statement.</li><li>3. Council declared land liable to flooding across the Shire and minimum habitable floor heights for Taroom and Theodore under Council Minute dated 14/12/2011. The resolution is reflective of the effect amendments to the current planning schemes would have had.</li><li>4. Consideration of flood hazards under the former State Planning Policy (SPP) and current SPP form part of <b>assessment</b> and reporting for development applications made assessable under the current planning schemes. It should be noted that most development in the Shire including new land subdivisions are assessable development under both schemes.</li><li>5. Council is currently preparing a <i>Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (SPA)</i> compliant planning scheme, which addresses flood hazards. It should be noted that ongoing consultation about flood provisions in the scheme is occurring between Council and State agencies, including the display of the draft scheme for public comment. It should also be noted that changes of Government and significant adjustments to Queensland's planning system have resulted in delays in finalising the draft</li></ol>

IGEM Cyclone Marcia report page 6/7 town planning section – paragraphs	Council comment/response
	<p>planning scheme.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Council provides free planning enquiry and pre-lodgement services, and Council staff are available to assist property owners in determining whether properties are mapped and provide additional information from Council's records and GIS system.</li> <li>7. Council is preparing a flood study to accurately document flood information and new planning scheme.</li> <li>8. Subsequent to the 2010 flood event, the State Government recognised the inadequacy of the majority of flood mapping in Queensland and created the QRA Flood mapping which is available free on the internet.</li> </ol>
<p>The Natural Hazard Risk Assessment report prepared for the Council in 2012 outlines existing preventative and preparedness controls for flood risks. Controls include land use controls and building restrictions, such as zoning, removal of existing buildings, establishing minimum floor levels, and raising buildings. In practice, this does not appear to occur. Lessons identified from previous events, along with information available in the Natural Hazard Risk Assessment Report do not appear to inform town planning, with the exception of Taroom and Theodore. We have been told, however, that Council has lodged an amended planning scheme with government.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Subsequent to the 2010 event, Council adopted Council Minute dated 14/12/2011 to adopt the QRA flood mapping as this was the best resource available to Council; the Council resolution was in the form suggested by the State Government. It is noted that the resolution set floor heights for Taroom and Theodore as these were the areas impacted by the 2010 flood event. In any case, the Council resolution should trigger, as a minimum, enquiries about flooding from building certifiers practicing in the Banana Shire (see section 30 (f) of the <i>Building Act 1975</i>).</li> <li>2. Council is currently preparing a SPA-compliant planning scheme which addresses flood hazards.</li> <li>3. Amendments to the planning scheme to reflect the 2010 resolution could do little more than the resolution provided for. Moreover, given the intensity of the recent events, it may have proved ineffective in terms of the level of inundation.</li> <li>4. Council is preparing a flood study to accurately document flood information and new planning scheme.</li> <li>5. Most development in the Shire including new land subdivisions are assessable development under both schemes. This triggers (in identified flood areas) Council's consideration of the SPP provisions for flood (see SPA s313 &amp; s314). This assessment, in practice, has resulted in conditional requirements for new development in flood prone areas</li> </ol>

IGEM Cyclone Marcia report page 6/7 town planning section – paragraphs	Council comment/response
	or grounds for refusing applications.
<p>Queensland Reconstruction Authority (QRA) maps are used to show past flood areas (in the form of a map overlay). These maps are not available in high enough resolution to enable the identification of flood levels expected for particular properties.</p>	<p>1. Council provides free planning enquiry and pre-lodgement services, and Council staff are available to assist property owners in determining whether properties are mapped and provide additional information from Council's records and GIS system.</p>
<p>The issues with town planning came to light through an example highlighted to us. Two dwellings in the same street, approved and constructed in the last five years, were inundated in this event. The dwellings were approved after the Callide Valley Flood Study had been prepared for the Council, but before the events of 2013 and 2015. As the land is zoned 'rural', the building applications are therefore self-assessable. According to the council development codes, houses must be situated so they are "not subjected to unreasonable hazards...because of their location".</p> <p>Despite the street being within the QRA flood overlay area, there is no specific information provided by the Council to assist self-assessable applicants to determine what building or location decisions should be made to mitigate against the risk of flood. For one of these residences, the application and approval form that was prepared by the builder and lodged with Council did not acknowledge that the building site was adjacent to a watercourse. This error on the form may not have changed the outcome for the residents during the events of 2015, but is indicative of the lack of attention to detail regarding building controls or associated information.</p>	<p>1. In the case of the two dwellings identified, Council understands both applications were approved by private certifiers and not Council. The lodging of plans to Council is an administrative process under the <i>Building Act</i>.</p> <p>2. Council assumes the paragraph refers to IDAS Form 1 – Item 10. These application forms are prepared by the applicant in this case and lodged with a private building certifier. The accurate completion of these forms is the responsibility of the private certifier.</p>
<p>Currently, local knowledge appears the most likely factor to stop a similar situation occurring in the future, where a new residence is built on a comparable piece of land. A defined flood event level can be prescribed based on any information available to the Council at the time, including the flood heights in 2013 and 2015. This can be applied across the Banana Shire and is not restricted to only the areas that currently have minimum floor</p>	<p>1. The <i>Building Act</i> regime requires all building certifiers (Council and non-Council) to ensure that new dwellings are not affected by surface waters, i.e. no inundation in a Q100 design event. Other building industry best practice standards including the 'Queensland Development Code MP 3.5 – Construction of buildings in flood hazard areas' and 'National Flood Standard' are available for building certifiers and</p>

IGEM Cyclone Marcia report page 6/7 town planning section – paragraphs	Council comment/response
heights.	<p>members of the public when considering the design and location of new dwellings.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Council on request provides the best available flood information based on the local knowledge, the Callide flood study, QRA mapping and subsequent information and work.</li> <li>3. Subsequent to the 2010 event, Council adopted Council Minute dated 14/12/2011 to adopt the QRA flood mapping as this was the best resource available to Council; the Council resolution was in the form suggested by the State Government . It is noted that the resolution set floor heights for Taroom and Theodore as these were the areas impacted by the 2010 flood event. In any case, the Council resolution should trigger, as a minimum, enquiries about flooding from building certifiers practicing in the Banana Shire (see section 30 (f) of the <i>Building Act</i>).</li> </ol>
<p>The Council is presently pursuing amendments to its Planning Scheme through the Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning (DILGP). The Council's proposed plan has been in draft form for nearly two years, although this is not unusual for local government planning schemes. While it is for the DILGP to assess the appropriateness of the Council's proposed revisions, we note that the Council's proposal appears to include some improvements on its existing land use planning arrangements, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flooding is more prominently highlighted</li> <li>• Floor heights are based on either being (a) above 1% AEP flood height (i.e. a 1 in 100 year flood), or (b) the highest part of the site (if the 1% AEP flood height is unknown).<sup>41</sup></li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Council is preparing a flood study to accurately document flood information and new planning scheme.</li> <li>2. The State Government (DILGP) review the new planning scheme for compliance with the flooding issues and to sign off the new planning scheme.</li> <li>3. The draft scheme also seeks to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• provide greater strategic direction in terms of land use planning and flooding; and</li> <li>• manage other development in floodplains more effectively.</li> </ul> </li> </ol>
<p>The absence of flood modelling will still impact the proposed plan, as there will continue to be a reliance on local knowledge about previous flood heights rather than the ability to use more accurate data to inform planning decisions.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Council is preparing a flood study to accurately document flood information.</li> </ol>

## **ATTACHMENT 2**

### ***Bundle of Further Documents***

- LECC Terms of Reference;
- EA Request Template;
- Email to SDCC enclosing relevant EA mapping;
- Email chain to SDCC re EA

## **APPENDIX D**

# **TERMS OF REFERENCE**

## **Local Emergency Coordination Committee (LECC)**



### **BANANA SHIRE COUNCIL LOCAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN**

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Adopted 27 June 2011  
Page 1 of 8



**Document Control**

<b>Version</b>	<b>Notes</b>	<b>Release Date</b>
1	December 2010 Version	February 2011
2	June 2011 Version	June 2011

# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

## **Terms of Reference – Local Emergency Coordination Committee**

<b>1. BACKGROUND .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>3. DEFINITIONS / LIST OF TERMS, SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>4. RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>6. ROLE .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>7. FUNCTIONS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>8. SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>9. MEMBERSHIP .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>10. OPERATIONS .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>11. GOVERNANCE .....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>12. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>13. QUORUM .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>14. REGISTER OF ATTENDANCE .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>15. REVIEW OF TERMS OF REFERENCE .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Local Emergency Coordination Committee Report .....</b>	<b>8</b>

## 1. **BACKGROUND**

On the 15 March 2008 as part of the Queensland governments reform of local governments (Local Government Reform Implementation Regulation 2008), new local government boundaries came into affect. This reform has had significant impact in the reduction of Local Disaster Management Groups (LDMG) within Local Government areas.

## 2. **INTRODUCTION**

While Local Emergency Coordination Committees (LECC) are not recognized under the *Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements, Disaster Management Strategic Policy Framework* and the *Disaster Management Act 2003*, the Local Disaster Management Group is establishing these committees to assist in preparing for disaster events.

The purpose of the Local Emergency Coordination Committee is to establish a core group of people within the local community, who possess the local knowledge and expertise by providing information to the Local Disaster Management Group to ensure that disaster management and disaster operations within the local area are coordinated.

In the event of a disaster, the LECC does not have an operational role. However, members may be co-opted to assist with the on ground operational activities of the Local Disaster Coordination Centre.

## 3. **DEFINITIONS / LIST OF TERMS, SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS**

Disaster	A serious disruption in a community, caused by the impact of an event, that requires a significant coordinated response by the State and other entities to help the community recover from the disruption.
LECC	Local Emergency Coordination Committee
LEOC	Local Emergency Operations Centre
LDMG	Local Disaster Management Group
LDMP	Local Disaster Management Plan
LDCC	Local Disaster Coordination Centre
DDMG	District Disaster Management Group
DDMP	District Disaster Management Plan
DDCC	District Disaster Coordination Centre
SDMG	State Disaster Management Group
SDMP	State Disaster Management Plan
SDCC	State Disaster Coordination Centre
DDC	District Disaster Coordinator
DMA 2003	Disaster Management Act 2003
TOR	Terms of Reference
BSC	Banana Shire Council

## 4. **RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION**

Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements;  
 Queensland Disaster Management Planning Guidelines;  
 Disaster Management Strategic Policy Framework and  
 Disaster Management Act 2003.

## 5. GROUPS

- **Taroom**
- **Theodore / Cracow**
- **Moura / Banana**
- **Baralaba / Rannes**
- **Goovigen / Jambin**
- **Wowan / Dululu**

Biloela and Thangool will be managed by the Local Disaster Management Group.

## 6. ROLE

To provide information and assistance to the Banana Shire Local Disaster Management Group of potential or approaching disasters using local knowledge, expertise and understanding of social, environmental and economic issues for the local area.

## 7. FUNCTIONS

Banana Shire Council will establish a Local Emergency Coordination Committee for localities within the Banana Shire Local Disaster Management Group area that can be, in the event of a disaster, isolated from the Corporate Office locality.

Functions of the LECC groups will include but not limited to:

1. To provide relevant local information to the LDMG/LDC to ensure that disaster management and disaster operations in the area are consistent with the State group's strategic policy framework for disaster management in the State;
2. To help the LDMG/LDC prepare a Local Disaster Management sub-plan for its area;
3. To prepare and advise the LDMG/LDC of the requirements for effective local disaster management and regularly review and assess the disaster management arrangements and procedures which are consistent with the Local Disaster sub-plan;
4. To assist the LDMG in determining support services required to facilitate disaster management and disaster operations in the area;
5. To disseminate information from the LDMG to the community of ways of mitigating the adverse effects of an event, and preparing for, responding to and recovering from a disaster;
6. To provide reports and make recommendations to the LDMG/LDC about matters relating to disaster preparedness and operations;
7. To identify local resources available for use by the LDMG/LDC for disaster operations in the area;
8. To identify and review communications system in the LECC, and with the LDMG/LDC for use when a disaster happens;
9. To ensure information about a disaster or major incident in the area is promptly given to the LDMG/LDC; and
10. To perform functions as directed by the LDMG/LDC that is not mentioned in the points above.

## 8. SCOPE OF THE COMMITTEE

The scope of the Local Emergency Coordination Committee is as follows:

- This group is a local group operating under the direction of the Banana Shire Local Disaster Management Group and/or the Local Disaster Coordinator or delegate;
- It does not have any legal standing within the disaster management system;
- It must follow the direction of the LDMG and/or the Local Disaster Coordinator or delegate; and
- All activities and actions of the group must be appropriately endorsed and/or approved by the LDMG and/or the Local Disaster Coordinator or delegate.

## 9. MEMBERSHIP

The LDMG has determined the following membership guideline for the LECC as:

BSC Councillor	Chair
BSC Works Foreman (local area)	Deputy Chair
Police OIC	Member
QFRS Representative	Member
QAS OIC	Member
SES Group Leader (where established)	Member
QFRS Representative (optional)	Member
Community Representative	Advisor

Other government and non government agencies may be called upon by the LECC to provide advice and assistance as required.

## 10. OPERATIONS

### **Preparation of Disaster Management Plan**

In line with DMA 2003 and consistent with the Queensland Disaster Management Guidelines (for local governments) the LECC shall contribute to the development of the Local Disaster Management Plans and any subsidiary plans as may be relevant to the area.

### **Review of the Disaster Management Plan**

The LECC may review and recommend amendments to the Disaster Management Plan and any relevant subsidiary plans when the group considers it appropriate. Any such recommendations are to be provided in writing to the Local Disaster Management Group.

## 11. GOVERNANCE

### ***Reporting Arrangements and Key Performance Indicators:***

The LECC reports directly to the LDMG. At meetings held during the year the members of the LECC are to provide to the Chair of LDMG a report on agency disaster management arrangements. This information will be collated/recorded and at the end of each financial period, the chair of the LECC must prepare and give to the LDMG a written report about disaster management in the local area. Please refer to **Appendix A** for Report Form.

The report must include the following:

- Information about activities undertaken during the financial year to maintain or enhance the LECC disaster management arrangements;

- Information about priorities for disaster management; and
- Other matters about disaster management the LDMG considers appropriate.

## **12. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS**

LECC meetings shall be held at least once in every 6 months at the times and places decided by the chairperson of the group. One exercise is to be conducted during the year. This exercise can be incorporated into one of the meetings or as part of a Regional Exercise.

## **13. QUORUM**

A quorum for a meeting of the LECC is the number equal to one half of its members plus 1, or if one-half of its member is not a whole number, then the next highest whole number.

Advisors to the committee do not count toward a quorum.

## **14. REGISTER OF ATTENDANCE**

A register of attendance will be kept as part of the governance of this group.

## **15. REVIEW OF TERMS OF REFERENCE**

This Terms of Reference will be reviewed every two (2) years or whenever deemed necessary by changes to DMA 2003, DM policy, Local Disaster Management Group or organisational structure.

**Appendix A****Local Emergency Coordination Committee Report**

Report submitted by: (insert name/position)

Agency/organization: (insert name of agency)

Date:     /     / 20\_\_

Report submitted for inclusion in the minutes of the (insert Local/Agency/Organisation)  
Disaster Management Group meeting scheduled for (insert full date)

The following activities have been undertaken or are being undertaken by this agency:

PLANNING:

TRAINING (Internal):

TRAINING (External):

OPERATIONS:

EXERCISES:

PROJECTED ACTIVITIES:

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS:

NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT PROJECT ACTIVITIES: (if applicable)

CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OR MATTERS TO BE RAISED:

GENERAL BUSINESS:

Signed: (Insert Signature)





# DO NOT SEND THIS PAGE

## STEPS TO COMPLETE FIELDS 1 - 4

1. **EA Polygon Area** (e.g. detailed description and location reference to allow positive identification of message area, including street names with cross street, areas of interest such as parks, rivers, dams, coastal areas) it is preferable to attach a map identifying the message area. If a Threat Direction has been requested, please clearly indicate it on the map.
2. Tick applicable box and note the file name.
3. **Voice Message** Handwrite or type the required message. As the message will be translated by a Text To Speech process it is important that words are not unintelligible when translated e.g. “qld” used in a web site address must be entered as “q l d”, similarly the word “dot” must be entered into a web address instead of a full stop.

Voice Message ideally should have no more than 450 characters including spaces. Do not use special characters – refer to EA Operational Guidelines for details. Warning message must start with “Emergency Emergency”

*Example Voice: Emergency, Emergency. This is a Flash Flood Warning from the State Emergency Services. Areas in the Opal Valley are likely to experience rapidly rising water levels and property inundation over the next 2 hours, posing an immediate danger to residents. You should warn neighbours, secure your belongings and move to higher ground now. For more information listen to local radio. For flood assistance contact the State Emergency Services on 1 3 2 500*

4. **SMS** Is restricted to a maximum of 160 characters including spaces and punctuation. Either type the message or handwrite the characters into the boxes.

*Example SMS Flash Flood Warning from SES for Opal Valley-immediate threat to life/property-Warn others-Leave area/prepare NOW or seek higher ground-Listen to local radio*

If using existing EA templates, please provide the appropriate variables that are in the template. Refer to the Queensland Emergency Alert Guidelines for copies of the templates.

//DIRECTIONANDAREA//

//NAME//

//NUMBER//

//TIME//

//TIMEandDAY//

//DIRECTIONandPLACE//

//HOURSMINUTES//

//PLACE//

//PLACEPLACE//

//EXTERNAL/INTERNAL//

//SUBURBS//

//FireIncident//

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Friday, 20 February 2015 8:09 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Banana Shire Disaster Centre - Map

Here is the mapping as discussed. Please let me know if you are still having problems. My number is [REDACTED]

Thanks

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Disaster Management Coordinator

[REDACTED] [enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au](mailto:enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au) | [www.banana.qld.gov.au](http://www.banana.qld.gov.au)

Biloela Office: 62 Valentine Plains Road | Taroom Office: 18 Yaldwyn Street

Moura Office: 34 Gillespie Street | Postal: PO Box 412 Biloela QLD 4715

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**From:** SDCC [SDCC@qfes.qld.gov.au]  
**Sent:** Friday, 20 February 2015 8:29:38 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Banana Shire Coordination Centre - Map

Hi [REDACTED]

In the event that the map still does not load after following this attempt with GIS.

I have free drawn the polygon in EA. Could you please review attached and advise.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

**State Duty Officer**  
**State Disaster Coordination Centre | Queensland Fire and Emergency Services**

[REDACTED]

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, 20 February 2015 6:18 PM  
**To:** SDCC  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@police.qld.gov.au'; [REDACTED]@police.qld.gov.au'; [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: Banana Shire Coordination Centre - Map

Hi [REDACTED]

Last advice I had was that your GIS were ok with the map. Given the problems encountered the Local Disaster Coordinator has advised that the request for the advisory alert should be cancelled as we will more than likely be looking at a request in the near future for an EA (Emergency Warning). I will try to ensure that the mapping issue is sorted at our end before we get to that point.

Thanks for your assistance.

[REDACTED]

**Disaster Management Coordinator**

[REDACTED] [enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au](mailto:enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au) | [www.banana.qld.gov.au](http://www.banana.qld.gov.au)



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**Postal**  
PO Box 412  
Biloela QLD  
4715

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**From:** [REDACTED] **On Behalf Of** SDCC  
**Sent:** Friday, 20 February 2015 6:11 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** FW: Banana Shire Coordination Centre - Map

file:///C:/DataWrks/temp/1821617/dwa528.htm

21/05/2015

Hi [REDACTED]

GIS are still attempting to open the map file.

Would you please scan the map if possible and email a copy down?

Regards, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] | State Duty Supervisor, State Disaster Coordination Centre  
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services

[REDACTED]

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**From:** [REDACTED]

**Sent:** Friday, 20 February 2015 5:31 PM

**To:** SDCC

**Subject:** Banana Shire Coordination Centre - Map

As discussed with Tony and GIS person

[REDACTED]

Disaster Management Coordinator

[REDACTED] [enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au](mailto:enquiries@banana.qld.gov.au) | [www.banana.qld.gov.au](http://www.banana.qld.gov.au)

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